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Abstract
How should you take into account the opinions of an advisor?
When you completely defer to the advisor’s judgment (the manner
in which she responds to her evidence), then you should treat the ad-
visor as a guru. Roughly, that means you should believe what you ex-
pect she would believe, if supplied with your extra evidence. When
the advisor is your own future self, the resulting principle amounts
to a version of the Reflection Principle—a version amended to handle
cases of information loss.
When you count an advisor as an epistemic peer, you should give
her conclusions the same weight as your own. Denying that view—
call it the “equal weight view”—leads to absurdity: the absurdity that
you could reasonably come to believe yourself to be an epistemic su-
perior to an advisor simply by noting cases of disagreement with her,
and taking it that she made most of the mistakes. Accepting the view
seems to lead to another absurdity: that one should suspend judg-
ment about everything that one’s smart and well-informed friends
disagree on, which means suspending judgment about almost every-
thing interesting. But despite appearances, the equal weight view
does not have this absurd consequence. Furthermore, the view can
be generalized to handle cases involving not just epistemic peers, but
also epistemic superiors and inferiors.
Thanks to Cian Dorr, Andy Egan, John Hawthorne, Agustı´n Rayo, David Chris-
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tional University, the University of Sydney, the 2006 Formal Epistemology Workshop,
and the 2006 Bellingham Summer Philosophy Conference.
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1 Introduction
There are experts and gurus, people to whom we should defer entirely.
There are fakes and fools, who should be ignored. In between, there are
friends and other advisors (including our own future and past selves),
whose opinions should guide us in a less than fully authoritative way.
How, exactly, should we be guided by outside opinions?
2 Experts and gurus
Start with the simplest case: complete deference. When it comes to the
weather, I completely defer to the opinions of my local weather forecaster.
My probability for rain, given that her probability for rain is 60%, is also
60%. And the corresponding constraint holds for other propositions about
the weather. Using a variant of Gaifman’s (1988) terminology: I treat her
as an expert about the weather. That means: conditional on her having
probability x in any weather-proposition, my probability in that proposi-
tion is also x.1
In treating my forecaster this way, I defer to her in two respects. First,
I defer to her information: “As far as the weather goes,” I think to myself,
“she’s got all the information that I have—and more.” Second, I defer to
her judgment: I defer to the manner in which she forms opinions on the
basis of her information.
In the above case, we may suppose, I am right to treat my forecaster as
an expert. But advisors don’t always deserve such respect. For example,
suppose that the forecaster has plenty of meteorological information, but
I can see that she is dead drunk and so isn’t responding properly to that
information. In that case, I shouldn’t treat her as an expert. Or suppose
that the forecaster responds perfectly well to her information, but I can see
that I have information that she lacks. In that case too, I shouldn’t treat her
as an expert.
1See also Ha´jek (2003, 311), to which I owe both the above example and also the notion
of subject-matter-restricted expertise. Rich Thomason has pointed out that this way of
restricting expertise to a subject matter can be at most a rough approximation. For there
is no limit to the sort of evidence that might be relevant to the evaluation of weather-
propositions. As a result, to treat the forecaster as an expert in the above sense is to
potentially defer to her on the evaluation of any sort of evidence.
2
Even in such cases, I shouldn’t just ignore her opinion. How should I
incorporate it? If my forecaster is drunk or otherwise addled, then I should
only partially defer to her judgment. I postpone discussion of such cases.
For now, suppose that I do completely defer to my forecaster’s judgment.
Nevertheless, I think that she lacks relevant information that I possess.
What then?
An example will suggest the answer. Suppose that my forecaster lacks
one highly relevant tidbit: that I have been secretly seeding the clouds for
rain. Suppose that I’m sure her probability for rain is low—5%, say. In
this case, I shouldn’t set my probability for rain to that same low value,
since my cloud-seeding activities make rain much more likely. But I should
be guided by the forecaster’s opinions. Roughly: my probability for rain
should be what hers would be if she were informed that I’d been seeding the
clouds.
More precisely: when I have information that my forecaster lacks, I
shouldn’t defer to her unconditional opinions. For those opinions are
based on an impoverished evidential base. But I should defer to her con-
ditional opinions: her opinions conditional on all of my extra information.
When an agent defers to an advisor in this way, let us say that the agent
treats the advisor as a guru.
Formally: suppose that I have probability function P. Then I treat an
advisor as an expert if for any proposition H and for any probability func-
tion P0 that I think the advisor may have,
P(Hjadvisor has P0) = P0(H).
In contrast, I treat the advisor as a guru if
P(Hjadvisor has P0) = P0(HjX),
where X is my extra information, supposing that the advisor has probabil-
ity function P0.2,3
2Compare to the motivation given in Hall (1994) for the move from the Old Principal
Principle to the New Principal Principle.
3The above definition is appropriate only if countably many potential cre-
dence functions are in play, in which case it entails the following requirement:
P(Hjadvisor’s prob for H is x) = x. In the more general case, a fancier reformulation
is in order. Such a reformulation might invoke a conception of conditional probability
that allows for probabilities conditional on probability-zero propositions (Popper 1952,
Renyi 1955). Or it might invoke integrals over probability densities. I suppress such
elaborations here and in subsequent discussion. Thanks here to Grant Reaber.
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3 Reflection
The above discussion concerns the manner in which one ought to take into
account the opinions of others. But one should also take into account the
opinions of one’s own future self. How? A provocative and precise answer
is given by the Reflection Principle4, according to which one should treat
one’s future self as an expert. The Reflection Principle entails, for example,
that one’s current probability for rain, given that one will tomorrow have
probability 25% for rain, ought also to be 25%. And it entails that the
corresponding constraint should hold for all other propositions and time
intervals.
But recall the weather forecaster case. To treat my forecaster as an ex-
pert is to defer to her with respect to both judgment and information. I
shouldn’t defer to her in this way if I have reason to doubt her on either
score. And the same goes for my future self: if I expect that I won’t be
thinking straight next week, or if I expect that I will lose information be-
tween now and next week, then I shouldn’t treat my next-week self as an
expert (Christensen 1991, Skyrms 1987, Talbott 1991).
Reflection has been criticized on exactly these grounds. But we should
distinguish two complaints. On the one hand, there is the complaint: ra-
tionality does not require that one defer to one’s future judgment, since
one may expect that one’s judgment will become impaired. For example,
Bob may reasonably doubt that at midnight he will be in good shape to
drive, even if he expects that by midnight he’ll be drunkenly confident
that his driving skills are perfect (Christensen 1991). In this case, Bob is
reasonable, but violates Reflection. Against this complaint, I will propose
a revised version of Reflection, appropriate for situations of partial defer-
ence.5 Hold off on that until section 6.
For now focus on a second complaint, to which there is an easy and
satisfying response. The second complaint: it isn’t a rational requirement
that one defer to one’s future self with respect to information, since one may
expect to lose information. For example, Joe may reasonably be confident
that this morning he had sushi for breakfast, even if he expects that in a
year, he will have forgotten the truth of that claim (Talbott 1991). In this
case, Joe is reasonable, but violates Reflection.
4See van Fraassen (1984), van Fraassen (1995), Goldstein (1983).
5Some defenses of the original version are explored in van Fraassen (1995).
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In response to this second complaint, it has been suggested that Re-
flection be limited so that it simply does not apply to cases of expected
information loss.6 Such a limited principle would avoid trouble by re-
maining silent about the trouble cases. But Reflection should not remain
silent about such cases, since one’s future opinion should constrain one’s
present opinion, even if one expects to lose information.
For a better response, think back to the previous section. Suppose that
I defer to the judgment of my weather forecaster. Then, even if I have
information that she lacks, her opinion should constrain my own. Roughly,
I should believe what I think she would believe, if she were given my extra
information. More precisely: I should treat my forecaster not as an expert,
but a guru.
The same holds with respect to my future self. Suppose that I defer
to the judgment of my future self. Then, even if I have information that
I will later lack, my future opinion should constrain my present opinion.
Roughly, I should believe what I think my future self would believe, if
my future self were given my present extra information. More precisely: I
should treat my future self not as an expert, but as a guru.
The moral is that expected information loss does not break the connec-
tion between one’s future opinion and one’s present opinion: it modifies
that connection.7 The modified connection is expressed by the principle
“Treat your future self as a guru”. Formally, the proposal is that for any
proposition H and for any probability function P0 that one thinks one may
have at a future time t,
P(HjI have P0 at t) = P0(HjX),
where X is the extra information one presently possesses, supposing that
6Such limited principles include “Reflection Restricted”, from Jeffrey (1988, 233), and
“Confidence”, from Hall (1999, 668).
7I owe this observation to Hall (1994, 510), which makes the point in the context of
constraints on rational belief about objective chance: “The inadmissible proposition E
does not break the connection between credence and chance, but merely alters it: instead
of making credence conform to the unconditional chances, one makes credence conform
to conditional chances...” [Note added February 28, 2011].
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one has P0 at t.8,9
This modified principle handles cases of information loss not by re-
maining silent, but by yielding reasonable verdicts. For example, recall
the case of Joe, the forgetful sushi-eater. The modified principle yields the
desired verdict, that Joe should be confident that he had sushi for break-
fast. For though Joe expects his future self to doubt this claim, he expects
his future self to be confident in it, conditional on his current extra information
(which includes vivid memories of having recently eaten sushi).
4 Losing track of the time
There is another sort of information loss, a sort associated with losing track
of who one is or what time it is. Information loss of that sort can also lead
to violations of Reflection. For example10, suppose that you are waiting
for a train. You are only 50% confident that the train will ever arrive, but
are sure that if it does arrive, it will arrive in exactly one hour. Since you
have no watch, when fifty-five minutes have in fact elapsed you will be
unsure whether an hour has elapsed. As a result, at that time you will
have reduced confidence—say, only 40% confidence—that the train will
ever arrive. So at the start, you can be sure that when fifty-five minutes
have elapsed, your probability that the train will ever arrive will have gone
down to 40%. But that doesn’t show that your current probability should
be 40%. So your anticipated imperfect ability to keep track of time creates
a violation of Reflection. (Another example: Horgan (2004) convincingly
diagnoses the Reflection-violating belief change associated with the Sleep-
ing Beauty problem as resulting from information loss about what time it
is.)
Again, the proper lesson is not that the connection between current
and future beliefs is broken, but rather that it is modified. But the above
proposal—that one ought to treat one’s future self not as an expert but as a
guru—does not suffice. An additional, completely separate fix is required.
8Here for simplicity it is assumed that one’s total evidence is the strongest proposition
one believes with certainty. If that assumption is relaxed, one would have to take as basic
the notion of an agent’s total evidence, and modify the proposal accordingly. Thanks here
to Bas van Fraassen.
9For a similar proposal, along with criticisms of the present one, see Weisberg (2005,
Section 5).
10This example is a retelling of the “prisoner in the cell” case from Arntzenius (2003).
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To motivate the fix, notice that in the waiting-for-the-train case your
probabilities should not match what you expect to believe in fifty-five min-
utes. Instead they should match what you expect to believe in fifty-five
minutes given that exactly fifty-five minutes have elapsed. More generally, the
definition of what it is to treat someone as a guru can be modified in order
to “bracket off” the manner in which an agent’s uncertainty about what
time it is (and who she is) affects her beliefs about other matters. Applied
to the case of a single person over time, the resulting principle requires
that for any subject S with probability function P at time t, any proposi-
tion H, and any probability function P0 that the subject thinks she might
have at future time t0,
P(HjI have P0 at t0 & I am S at t) = P0(HjX& I am S at t0),
where X is the subject’s extra information at time t, on the supposition that
she has P0 at t0.11
5 Experts and gurus are rare
So: when one completely defers to one’s future judgment, one should treat
one’s future self as a guru. But when should one completely defer to one’s
future judgment? More generally, when should one completely defer to
the judgment of any advisor?
Rarely.
Only in highly idealized circumstances is it reasonable to defer to some-
one’s opinion absolutely whatever that opinion might be. For example, upon
finding out that my forecaster is confident that it will snow tomorrow, I
will follow suit. But upon finding out that my forecaster is confident that
it will rain eggplants tomorrow, I will not follow suit. I will conclude that
my forecaster is crazy. The same goes for the news that I myself will be-
lieve that it will rain eggplants tomorrow. In realistic cases, one reasonably
discounts opinions that fall outside an appropriate range.
In addition, not even a perfect advisor deserves absolute trust, since
one should be less than certain of one’s own ability to identify good advi-
sors.12
11See also Schervish et al. (2004).
12I owe this point to Peter Railton.
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So: only in highly idealized cases is it appropriate to treat someone as
an expert or a guru, and so to completely defer to that person’s judgment.
All the more reason to consider cases of partial deference, to which we
now turn.
6 Dividing the question
How should one take into account the opinions of an advisor who may
have imperfect judgment? That question factors into two parts:
1. To what degree should one defer to a given advisor’s judgment? For
example, when should one count an advisor’s judgment as com-
pletely worthless? Or as approximately as good as one’s own? Or
as better than one’s own, but still less than perfect?
2. Given one’s assessment of an advisor’s level of competence, how
should one take that advisor’s opinion into account?
On the first question, I have no substantive answer to offer here. My
excuse is that the question concerns a huge, difficult, and domain-specific
matter. How should one judge the epistemic abilities of weather fore-
casters, dentists, math professors, gossipy neighbors, and so on? This is
a question with the same sort of massive scope as the question: “When
does a batch of evidence support a given hypothesis?” Fearsome ques-
tions both, and worthy of investigation. But leave them for another day.
Here I will focus on the second question. Assume that you defer to
an advisor’s judgment to a certain degree. Given that rating of the advi-
sor’s judgment, how should you take her opinions into account? We have
already settled this in the special case in which you utterly defer to the
advisor’s judgment. In that case, you should treat the advisor as a guru.
It remains to consider cases in which you defer to an advisor’s judgment
only partially.
Start with the simplest such case, a case that has been the subject of con-
siderable discussion and dispute (Christensen 2007, Feldman 2004, Kelly
2005, Plantinga 2000, van Inwagen 1996): how should your opinion be
guided by an advisor who you count as having judgment that is as good
as your own?
8
7 Peer disagreement: setup
Suppose that you and your friend independently evaluate the same fac-
tual claim—for example, the claim that the death penalty significantly de-
terred crime in Texas in the 1980s.13 Each of you has access to the same
crime statistics, sociological reports, and so on, and has no other relevant
evidence. Furthermore, you count your friend as an epistemic peer—as
being as good as you at evaluating such claims.14,15
You perform your evaluation, and come to a conclusion about the claim.
But then you find out that your friend has come to the opposite conclu-
sion. How much should this news move you in the direction of her view?
Should you always give your friend’s assessment equal weight, and think
that it is no more likely that you’re right than that she is? Or can it some-
times be rational for you to stick to your guns, or at least give your own
assessment some extra weight?
Answer: you should give the assessments equal weight.
Before refining and defending this equal weight view, let me attack it.
8 Unwelcome consequence of the equal weight view
According to the equal weight view, one should give the same weight to
one’s own assessments as one gives to the assessments of those one counts
as one’s epistemic peers. If the view is right for the case of one peer, it
surely is also right for the case of many peers.16 But in the case of many
peers, the view seems to have unwelcome consequences.
13I borrow this example from van Inwagen (1996, 141).
14I owe the term “epistemic peer” to Gutting (1982) by way of Kelly (2005), though I
use it in a different way than they do. See note 22.
15Note that in setting up the problem, the initial assumption is that you count your
friend as your epistemic peer. That contrasts with some presentations, in which the ini-
tial assumption is that your friend is your epistemic peer. The former assumption is
appropriate, however. For example, one sometimes is reasonable in thinking wise advi-
sors to be foolish. Evidence, after all, can be misleading. In such cases, one is reasonable
in being guided by one’s assessments of the advisor’s ability, even if those assessments are
in fact incorrect.
16Or at least: a very natural generalization of it is right for the case of many peers.
The generalization would have to take into account, for example, the degree to which
one judges that one’s peers reached their conclusions independently. For simplicity, I
suppress such complications here.
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First unwelcome consequence: spinelessness. Consider an issue on which
you count many of your associates as epistemic peers. If the issue is at
all tricky, your peers undoubtedly take a wide spectrum of stances on it.
(This is especially true if your peers are philosophers.) The equal weight
view then requires you to weigh each stance equally, along with your own.
But that requires you to think, of each stance, that it is very unlikely to be
right. Typically, it will follow that you ought to suspend judgment on the
issue. Since it seems that you are in this circumstance with respect to a
great many issues, the equal weight view requires you to suspend judg-
ment on all of these. Do you have any convictions on controversial po-
litical, philosophical, or scientific matters? The equal weight view seems
to say: kiss them goodbye. It is implausible that rationality requires such
spinelessness (Pettit 2005, van Inwagen 1996).
Second unwelcome consequence: lack of self-trust. Suppose that a great
fraction of those you count as your epistemic peers agree with you on
some issue. Then the equal weight view says: stick with your initial as-
sessment. Great! Except that the reason for sticking to that assessment has
very little to do with your own evaluation of the common stock of evi-
dence, and very much to do with the fraction of your peers who agree
with you. Shouldn’t your own careful consideration of the issue count
for more than 1/100th, even if there are 99 people you count as epistemic
peers? If not, then one might just as well form views on controversial mat-
ters by simply sending out a poll (Landesman 2000). It is implausible that
rationality requires you to give your own consideration of the issue such
a minor role.17
These are unwelcome consequences of the equal weight view. One
might try to mitigate the consequences by claiming that most of the dis-
puted issues are not matters of fact, or that people rarely share their rel-
evant evidence, or that one shouldn’t count many of one’s associates as
peers after all.18 Or one might try to make the consequences more palat-
able (Christensen 2007, Feldman 2004). I will not discuss these strategies
at present. The present point is this: even if the equal weight view is right,
it is not obviously right.
What reinforces this point is that the equal weight view stands in com-
17Furthermore, in light of such considerations, one might be tempted to avoid the hard
work of thinking an issue through oneself, by simply deferring to the aggregated opin-
ions of one’s peers. This leads to the free-rider problem explored in List and Pettit (2003).
18van Inwagen (1996) scotches many such strategies.
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petition with views that clearly avoid the unwelcome consequences. Two
such views deserve special note.
9 Competitors to the equal weight view
The first competing view is the extra weight view, according to which
one should give one’s own assessment more weight than the assessments
of those one counts as epistemic peers.19 For example, when you find out
that your sole epistemic peer has arrived at a contrary conclusion, the extra
weight view says that you should be pulled a bit in the peer’s direction—
but not half way. You should still think it more likely that you are right
than that the peer is.
By granting special status to one’s own assessments, the extra weight
view mitigates the unwelcome consequences described in the previous
section. For if your own assessment gets extra weight, you may reason-
ably stick to your guns to a great degree, even if a handful of your peers
disagree. So the extra weight view does not require a spineless suspen-
sion of judgment on all controversial matters. Furthermore, on the extra
weight view, your own assessment of the evidence has more impact on the
formation of your overall view than it does on the equal weight view.
To introduce another competitor to the equal weight view, recall the
guiding question: when you find out that your peer has arrived at the
opposite conclusion as you, how much should you be moved?
According to the right-reasons view, the answer depends on how good
your initial evaluation of the evidence was.20 For example, suppose that
the shared batch of evidence in fact strongly supports the disputed claim.
You correctly apprehend this, but your peer misjudges the force of the
19This view is described (but not endorsed) in Feldman (2004, 14). A close cousin of
it—the view that “egocentric epistemic bias” is legitimate—is defended in Wedgwood
(2007, Chapter 11).
20I learned of this view from Kelly (2005, 180). Here is a representative quotation:
The rationality of the parties engaged in [a disagreement among epistemic
peers] will typically depend on who has in fact correctly evaluated the avail-
able evidence and who has not. If you and I have access to the same body
of evidence but draw different conclusions, which one of us is being more
reasonable (if either) will typically depend on which of the different conclu-
sions (if either) is in fact better supported by that body of evidence.
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evidence and as a result disagrees. In this case, the right-reasons view
says it can be reasonable for you to stick to your (correct) evaluation.
What motivates the view is that there is an asymmetry in the above sort
of dispute. Although each disputant thinks that he has correctly assessed
the force of the evidence, at most one of the disputants has in fact done so
(Kelly 2005, 180). A defender of the right-reasons view invites us to think
of things as follows. Suppose that you have arrived at the conclusion that
the evidence in fact supports—call it Conclusion C. Your peer has gotten
things wrong and arrived at some other conclusion. What does rationality
require? That you stick with Conclusion C, and that your peer switch to
Conclusion C.21
The right-reasons view mitigates the problems of spinelessness and
lack of self-trust. For when you have in fact assessed the evidence cor-
rectly, the view entails that you may reasonably stick to that assessment,
even if a handful of your peers disagree. For the same reason, the view
allows that even if you have many peers, your own assessment of the evi-
dence need not be swamped.
To sum up: when you disagree with your peer, the situation is symmet-
ric in the sense that your assessment seems right to you, and your peer’s
assessment seems right to him. What might break the symmetry? The ex-
tra weight view says: you should give your own assessment extra weight
because it is yours. The right-reasons view says: if in fact your assessment
is right, it deserves extra weight because it is right. Both views avoid the
unwelcome consequence that your own assessments must be swamped
when you have a large number of peers.
In contrast, the equal weight view says: even though your assessment
is your own, and even if it is in fact correct, you shouldn’t favor it even a
tiny bit. It is time to defend the equal weight view.
10 For the equal weight view: bootstrapping
To see the correctness of the equal weight view, start with a case of percep-
tual disagreement.
21In its most extreme form, the right-reasons view holds that when a disputant has
correctly assessed the force of the evidence, rationality permits him to be entirely unmoved
by the news of peer disagreement. A more modest version holds that when a disputant
has correctly assessed the force of the evidence, rationality permits him to be moved less
than half way in the direction of a peer’s contrary assessment.
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You and a friend are to judge the same contest, a race between Horse
A and Horse B. Initially, you think that your friend is as good as you at
judging such races. In other words, you think that in case of disagreement
about the race, the two of you are equally likely to be mistaken. The race
is run, and the two of you form independent judgments. As it happens,
you become confident that Horse A won, and your friend becomes equally
confident that Horse B won.
When you learn of your friend’s opposing judgment, you should think
that the two of you are equally likely to be correct. For suppose not—
suppose it were reasonable for you to be, say, 70% confident that you are
correct. Then you would have gotten some evidence that you are a better
judge than your friend, since you would have gotten some evidence that
you judged this race correctly, while she misjudged it. But that is absurd.
It is absurd that in this situation you get any evidence that you are a better
judge (Christensen 2007, Section 4).
To make this absurdity more apparent, suppose that you and your
friend independently judge the same long series of races. You are then
allowed to compare your friend’s judgments to your own. (You are given
no outside information about the race outcomes.) Suppose for reductio
that in each case of disagreement, you should be 70% confident that you
are correct. It follows that over the course of many disagreements, you
should end up extremely confident that you have a better track record
than your friend. As a result, you should end up extremely confident that
you are a better judge. But that is absurd. Without some antecedent reason
to think that you are a better judge, the disagreements between you and
your friend are no evidence that she has made most of the mistakes.
Furthermore, the above judgment of absurdity is independent of who
in fact has done a better job. Even if in fact you have judged the series
of races much more accurately than your friend, simply comparing judg-
ments with your friend gives you no evidence that you have done so.
Here is the bottom line. When you find out that you and your friend
have come to opposite conclusions about a race, you should think that the
two of you are equally likely to be correct.
The same goes for other sorts of disagreements.
Suppose that instead of judging a race, you and your friend are to judge
the truth of a claim, based on the same batch of evidence. Initially, you
count your friend as an epistemic peer—you think that she is about as
good as you at judging the claim. In other words, you think that, con-
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ditional on a disagreement arising, the two of you are equally likely to
be mistaken.22 Then the two of you perform your evaluations. As it hap-
pens, you become confident that the claim is true, and your friend becomes
equally confident that it is false.
When you learn of your friend’s opposing judgment, you should think
that the two of you are equally likely to be correct. The reason is the same
as before. If it were reasonable for you to give your own evaluation extra
weight—if it were reasonable to be more than 50% confident that you are
right—then you would have gotten some evidence that you are a better
evaluator than your friend. But that is absurd.
Again, the absurdity is made more apparent if we imagine that you and
your friend evaluate the same long series of claims. Suppose for reductio
that whenever the two of you disagree, you should be, say, 70% confi-
dent that your friend is the mistaken one. It follows that over the course
of many disagreements, you should end up extremely confident that you
have a better track record than your friend. As a result, you should end
up extremely confident that you are a better evaluator. But that is absurd.
Without some antecedent reason to think that you are a better evaluator,
the disagreements between you and your friend are no evidence that she
has made most of the mistakes.
Again, this absurdity is independent of who has in fact evaluated the
claims properly. Even if in fact you have done a much better job than your
friend at evaluating the claims, simply comparing your verdicts to those
of your friend gives you no evidence that this is so.
The above argument has the same form as a certain well-known ob-
22My use of the term “epistemic peer” is nonstandard. On my usage, you count your
friend as an epistemic peer with respect to an about-to-be-judged claim if and only if
you think that, conditional the two of you disagreeing about the claim, the two of you are
equally likely to be mistaken. On more standard usages, an epistemic peer is defined to be
an equal with respect to such factors as “intelligence, perspicacity, honesty, thoroughness,
and other relevant epistemic virtues” (Gutting 1982, 83), “familiarity with the evidence
and arguments which bear on [the relevant] question”, and “general epistemic virtues
such as intelligence, thoughtfulness, and freedom from bias” (Kelly 2005). In defense of
my use, suppose that you think that conditional on the two of you disagreeing about
a claim, your friend is more likely than you to be mistaken. Then however intelligent,
perspicacious, honest, thorough, well-informed, and unbiased you may think your friend
is, it would seem odd to count her as an epistemic peer with respect to that claim, at least
on that occasion. You think that on the supposition that there is disagreement, she is
more likely to get things wrong.
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jection to reliabilism (Goldman 1986, Sosa 1997). According to reliabilism,
one can gain knowledge by a reliable method, even if one does not know
that the method is reliable. For example, suppose that your color vision is
in fact reliable. In that case—according to reliabilism—by looking at a red
wall you can come to know that the wall is red, even if you don’t know
that your vision is reliable.23
Now for the objection. If reliabilism is right, then in the above case
you get some evidence that your vision is reliable merely by looking at the
wall. That is because you come to know that your vision has operated cor-
rectly on that occasion. By looking at many walls, you can come to know
that your vision has operated correctly on many occasions, and hence can
come to know that your vision is reliable. In other words, you can come
to know that your vision is reliable merely by checking that the outputs
of your visual system agree with . . . the outputs of your visual system.
Such procedures, called “bootstrapping” (Vogel 2000, 615) or the gaining
of “easy knowledge” (Cohen 2002), are clearly illegitimate. But it follows
from reliabilism they can be legitimate. That is the objection.
We have seen that rivals to the equal weight view are subject to an
analogous objection. For suppose that it was legitimate to give your own
evaluations more weight than those of a friend who you initially count
as a peer. Then it could be legitimate for you to “bootstrap”—to come
to be confident that you are a better evaluator than the friend merely by
noting cases of disagreement, and taking it that the friend made most of
the errors.24 But that is absurd. So it is not legitimate to give your own
evaluations more weight than those who you count as peers. A similar
argument shows that it is not legitimate to give your own evaluations less
weight than those who you count as peers.
So the equal weight view is correct.
23For ease of exposition, a simplified version of reliabilism about knowledge is targeted
here. But the guiding idea of the objection can be wielded against more sophisticated
versions.
24Proponents of the right-reasons view are only committed to the legitimacy of this sort
of bootstrapping when the bootstrapper does in fact evaluate the evidence better than her
opponent. The bootstrapping conclusion is absurd even in this case.
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11 The equal weight view, refined
This section describes two complications. They require tweaking the equal
weight view, but not in a way that interferes with the above defense.
To start, recall what the equal weight view says. Suppose that before
evaluating a claim, you think that you and your friend are equally likely
to evaluate it correctly. When you find out that your friend disagrees with
your verdict, how likely should you think it that you are correct? The
equal weight view says: 50%.
But here is a complication. Suppose that while evaluating the claim,
you get some relevant information about the circumstances of the dis-
agreement. For example, suppose that the weather gets extremely hot,
and you know that your friend—unlike you—can’t think straight in hot
weather. In that case, when you find out that your friend disagrees, you
should end up fairly confident that she is the mistaken one.
In particular, suppose that before evaluating the claim, the following
was true: conditional on a disagreement arising in hot weather, you were
80% confident that your friend would be the mistaken one. In that case,
when a disagreement does arise in hot weather, you should be 80% con-
fident that your friend is the mistaken one (Christensen 2007, Section 4).
And the same goes for initial degrees of confidence other than 80%.
The point is that you should not be guided by your prior assessment of
your friend’s overall judging ability. Rather, you should be guided by your
prior assessment of her judging ability conditional on what you later learn
about the judging conditions.
Notice that the above view is more general than the equal weight view,
as first stated. For at the start, the equal weight view applied only to cases
in which you initially count your advisor as a peer—as equally likely to be
right, on the supposition that the two of you end up disagreeing. But the
modified view also applies to cases in which you initially count an advisor
as an epistemic superior—as being more than 50% likely to be right, on the
supposition that the two of you end up disagreeing. Likewise, the view
applies to cases in which you initially count an advisor as an epistemic
inferior.
Also note that one might have differing assessments of an advisor’s
abilities with respect to different issues. For example, one might count
an advisor as a peer with respect to arithmetic, but as less than a peer
with respect to disputes about euthanasia. So despite the name, the equal
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weight view does not in general call for simply averaging together one’s
probability function with that of one’s advisor.
There is a second complication. The above view appeals to your prior
assessment of your friend’s abilities—the assessment you had before think-
ing through the disputed issue. But what if you thought through the dis-
puted issue years ago, before you even met this friend? Then it won’t help
to consider what you believed about the friend’s abilities way back then.
For at that time, you had not even met the friend (and hence had no in-
formed opinion of her abilities). So the equal weight view is useless in this
case. How can it be fixed?
For an answer, notice that the whole point of considering your past
beliefs was to get access to a state of opinion untainted by your detailed
reasoning about the disputed issue.25 One way to do that is to consider
what you believed before thinking the issue through. But that is not the
only way. Sometimes we may sensibly ask what a given agent believes,
bracketing or factoring off or setting aside certain considerations. For ex-
ample, suppose that your views on the trustworthiness of Jennifer Lopez
derive from both tabloid reports and face-to-face interactions. In this case,
we may sensibly ask what your views of Lopez are, setting aside what the
tabloids say. To ask this is not to ask about your actual beliefs at some pre-
vious time. Rather, it is to ask what happens when we remove or extract
tabloid-based information from your current state of belief.
Likewise, in case of disagreement between you and a friend, we may
ask what you believe, setting aside your detailed reasoning (and what you
know of your friend’s reasoning) about the disputed issue. In particular,
we may ask who you think would likely be correct, setting that reasoning
aside. By construction, the resulting belief state is untainted by (“prior
to”) your reasoning about the disputed issue. But since only the disputed
reasoning has been extracted, that belief state still reflects your general
information about your friend’s abilities. The equal weight view is best
understood as invoking this non-temporal notion of prior belief.26 Here is
the resulting view:
25Compare to the requirement of Christensen (2007) that explanations of a disagree-
ment be evaluated independently from the disputed issue.
26This non-temporal notion of prior belief is similar to the notion of a “pre-prior” in-
voked in Hanson (2006), and the equal weight view is similar to the “pre-rationality con-
dition” defended in that paper.
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Equal weight view Upon finding out that an advisor disagrees, your prob-
ability that you are right should equal your prior conditional proba-
bility that you would be right. Prior to what? Prior to your thinking
through the disputed issue, and finding out what the advisor thinks
of it. Conditional on what? On whatever you have learned about the
circumstances of the disagreement.27
Note that in applying the view, the “circumstances of a disagreement”
should not include a detailed specification of the chain of reasoning that
led you to your conclusion. For if they did, then making the relevant
conditional probability judgment would involve thinking through the dis-
puted issue—and hence would not be prior to your doing so.
For example, suppose that you and a friend get different answers to
the same multiplication problem. In applying the equal weight view to
this case, the circumstances of disagreement might include such factors
as: the amount of scratch paper available to you and your friend; how
much coffee each of you has recently drunk; how confident the two of you
were in your respective answers (after doing the calculation, but before
finding out about the disagreement); how absurd each of you finds the
other’s answer; and whether the calculation involves carrying many 1s
(this last factor would be relevant if, for example, you know your friend
often forgets to carry his 1s).
In general, circumstances of disagreement should be individuated just
coarsely enough so that the relevant conditional probability judgment is
genuinely prior to your reasoning about the disputed issue. (This coarse-
ness constraint is what makes the equal weight view nontrivial. For
27In talking about your conditional probability that one is “right”, the above formu-
lation assumes that disputants arrive at all-or-nothing assessments of the claim under
dispute. That assumption is adopted only as a convenience. It is relaxed in the following
more general formulation of the view:
Your probability in a given disputed claim should equal your prior condi-
tional probability in that claim. Prior to what? Prior to your thinking through
the claim, and finding out what your advisor thinks of it. Conditional on
what? On whatever you have learned about the circumstances of how you
and your advisor have evaluated the claim.
Note that this formulation governs one’s response not just to cases in which your advisor
disagrees, but also to cases in which she agrees or suspends judgment. Note also that this
formulation does not presuppose any view on the “uniqueness thesis” (Feldman 2004),
according to which rational disagreements can only arise from differences in evidence.
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otherwise—if the view simply required that one’s new opinion should
equal one’s prior opinion, conditional on all of one’s new information—
the view would be tantamount to the requirement that one conditionalize
on one’s new information.)
Taking into account circumstances of disagreement also provides an
answer to a natural objection to the equal weight view.28 The objection is
that when an advisor you treated as a peer comes up with a conclusion that
you find utterly insane, you can be reasonable in thinking it more likely
that you are right than that the advisor is. Christensen (2007) gives a nice
example of this: you and your friend do some arithmetic to divide the
bill on a modest dinner. You get an answer of $28, and your friend gets an
answer of $280. It certainly seems as though you should be more confident
that you are right than that your friend is. And that is incompatible with
what the equal weight view seems to entail about the case.
The reply to the objection is that the equal weight view delivers the
intuitively correct verdict. For according to the equal weight view, your
probability that you are right should equal your prior probability that you
would be right, conditional on what you later learn about the circumstances of
the disagreement. And one circumstance of the split-the-check disagree-
ment is that you are extremely confident that your advisor’s answer is
wrong—much more confident than you are that your answer is right. In-
deed, her answer strikes you as obviously insane. So in order to apply
the equal weight view, we must determine your prior probability that you
would be right, conditional on these circumstances arising.
To do so, think of your state of mind before doing the calculation. We
have assumed that, conditional on the two of you disagreeing, you think
that your advisor is just as likely as you to be right. But it is also natural to
assume that, conditional on the two of you disagreeing and your finding her
answer utterly insane, you think that you are much more likely to be right.
If so, then when that circumstance arises the equal weight view instructs
you to favor your own answer. That is the intuitively correct verdict about
the case.29
What makes the above answer work is an asymmetry in the case. You
find your advisor’s answer insane, but have no special information about
her reaction to your answer. We might add to the case to restore the sym-
28Thanks to Paolo Santorio for pressing me on this objection.
29This is a generalization of the reply to this case in Christensen (2007).
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metry. Suppose that in addition to her answer, you also find out what your
advisor thinks of your answer: that it is utterly insane, obviously out of the
ballpark, and so on. In other words, you find out that she has exactly the
same attitude about your answer as you have about hers.
To get the equal weight view’s verdict about this case, turn again to
your state of mind before doing the calculation. Conditional on the two of
you disagreeing, and each of you finding the other’s answer to be insane,
do you think that the two of you are likely to be right? The description
of the case doesn’t settle this, but suppose that the answer is “yes”. (Per-
haps the two of you have had many such disagreements, and that upon
settling them, each of you has had to sheepishly admit defeat about half
of the time.) In that case, the equal weight view does entail that when the
disagreement arises, you should think it just as likely that your advisor
is right about the check as that you are. But with the symmetry-restoring
additions to the case, that verdict independently plausible.
That completes my explanation of the equal weight view, an account
of how to incorporate the opinions of an advisor to whom one only par-
tially defers. But it does not complete my defense. For recall that the view
seemed to have some unwelcome consequences.
12 The problems of spinelessness and self-trust
It is time to face the problems of spinelessness and self-trust. Start with the
problem of spinelessness—the problem that an egalitarian view on how
to respond to disagreement will recommend suspension of judgment on
virtually all controversial issues. Let me pose the problem again, from a
slightly different angle.
Views on disagreement face pressure from two directions. On the
one hand, when one considers clean, pure examples of disagreement, it
seems obvious that something like the equal weight view is correct. It
seems obvious that when you disagree about an arithmetic problem with
a friend who you previously considered to be equally good at arithmetic,
you should think yourself no more likely to be correct than your friend.
On the other hand, when one considers messy examples of real-world
disagreements about hard issues, the equal weight view seems to lead to
absurdity. Example: your friends take a range of stances on some basic
political or ethical claim. By your lights, these friends are just as thought-
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ful, well-informed, quick-witted, and intellectually honest as you. Still,
it seems obviously wrong that you are thereby required to suspend judg-
ment on the claim, as the equal weight view seems to entail. To require this
would be to require you to suspend of judgment on almost everything.
So: with respect to the clean, pure cases, there is pressure in the direc-
tion of the equal weight view. With respect to messy real-world cases, the
equal weight view seems to lead to absurdity. What gives?
The answer is that the equal weight view does not lead to absurdity,
because there is a relevant difference between the two sorts of cases. The
difference is that in the clean cases one is in a position to count one’s as-
sociates as peers based on reasoning that is independent of the disputed issue.
But in the messy real-world cases, one is rarely in a position to do so. That
is because in the messy cases, one’s reasoning about the disputed issue is
tangled up with one’s reasoning about many other matters (Pettit 2005).
As a result, in real-world cases one tends not to count one’s dissenting
associates—however smart and well-informed—as epistemic peers.
Let me explain, by way of a few examples.
Suppose that you disagree with your friend about the multiplication
problem “What is 5243324  922?”. You nevertheless count your friend
as a peer: setting aside your reasoning about this particular problem, you
think that she is equally likely to get the right answer in case of disagree-
ment.30 Your evaluation may be based on such factors as your friend’s
mathematical track record, what sort of training she has had, and so on. It
need not based on any particular view on the value of 5243324  922, or
on the answers to similar multiplication problems.31
In messy real-world cases, such independent peer evaluations are often
unavailable. For example, consider Ann and Beth, two friends who stand
at opposite ends of the political spectrum. Consider the claim that abortion
30Attempts to represent uncertainty about mathematics face the so-called “problem of
logical omniscience” (Stalnaker 1991). For present purposes, it does no harm to treat
arithmetical claims as logically independent contingent claims in the manner of Garber
(1983). Arithmetical reasoning will simply be assumed to change these probabilities over
time, in a way not represented in the model.
31The situation is different in case of disagreement about exceedingly simple mathe-
matical or logical problems. When a friend disagrees about whether 1+ 1 = 2, one may
well not count her as a peer. For one’s views on such a simple problem are closely linked
to one’s basic reasoning. For that reason, there may be no determinate fact about what
one believes, setting aside one’s views on whether 1 + 1 = 2. For further discussion of
this point, see the reply to the objection on p. 25.
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is morally permissible.32 Does Ann consider Beth a peer with respect to
this claim? That is: setting aside her own reasoning about the abortion
claim (and Beth’s contrary view about it), does Ann think Beth would be
just as likely as her to get things right?
The answer is “no”. For (let us suppose) Ann and Beth have discussed
claims closely linked to the abortion claim. They have discussed, for ex-
ample, whether human beings have souls, whether it is permissible to
withhold treatment from certain terminally ill infants, and whether rights
figure prominently in a correct ethical theory. By Ann’s lights, Beth has
reached wrong conclusions about most of these closely related questions.
As a result, even setting aside her own reasoning about the abortion claim,
Ann thinks it unlikely that Beth would be right in case the two of them dis-
agree about abortion.
In other words, setting aside Ann’s reasoning about abortion does not
set aside her reasoning about allied issues. And by Ann’s lights, the ac-
curacy of an advisor’s views on these allied issues indicates how accurate
the advisor is likely to be, when it comes to abortion. The upshot is that
Ann does not consider Beth an epistemic peer with respect to the abortion
claim.
So the abortion case is quite different than the multiplication case. Fur-
thermore, the contrast between them is representative. In the clean, pure
cases of disagreement used to motivate the equal weight view, the dis-
puted issues are relatively separable from other controversial matters.33
As a result, the agents in those examples often count their smart friends
and associates as peers about the issues under dispute. But in messy real-
world cases, the disputed issues are tangled in clusters of controversy.
As a result, though agents in those examples may count their associates
as thoughtful, well-informed, quick-witted, and so on, they often do not
count those associates as peers. For example, Ann does not count Beth as
a peer with respect to the abortion claim.
Think of a smart and well-informed friend who has a basic political
framework diametrically opposed to your own. Imagine that the two of
you are both presented with an unfamiliar and tricky political claim. You
32If you think that moral claims such as this are not factual claims, then please substi-
tute a clearly factual, hotly contested political claim. Unfortunately, many such claims
exist.
33Such pure cases include the savant cases from Feldman (2004) and Moller (2004), and
the “split the check” case from Christensen (2007).
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haven’t thought things through yet, and so have no idea what you will
eventually decide about the claim. Still—don’t you think that you are
more likely than your friend to correctly judge the claim, supposing that
the two of you end up disagreeing? If so, then however quick-witted,
well-informed, intellectually honest, and thorough you think your friend
is, you do not count her as an epistemic peer with respect to that claim.
And if you do not count her as a peer, the equal weight view does not re-
quire you give her conclusion the same weight as your own. Indeed, if you
think that your friend has been consistently enough mistaken about allied
issues, then the equal weight view requires you to become more confident
in your initial conclusion once you find out that she disagrees.
At the other extreme, think of a smart friend who has a basic political
framework extremely similar to your own. Again, imagine that both of
you have just been presented with an unfamiliar political claim. In this
case, you may well think that in case of disagreement, your friend is just
as likely as you to be correct. If so, and if you and your friend end up
coming to opposite verdicts, then the equal weight view requires you to
think it just as likely that she is right as that you are. But notice that friends
like these—friends who agree with you on issues closely linked to the one
in question—will very often agree with you on the one in question as well.
Moral: with respect to many controversial issues, the associates who
one counts as peers tend to have views that are similar to one’s own. That
is why—contrary to initial impressions—the equal weight view does not
require one to suspend judgment on everything controversial.
That is how the equal weight view escapes the problem of spineless-
ness.
What of the problem of self-trust? That problem arose because the
equal-weight view entails that one should weigh equally the opinions of
those one counts as peers, even if there are many such people. The prob-
lem is that it seems wrong that one’s independent assessment should be
so thoroughly swamped by sheer force of numbers. Shouldn’t one’s own
careful consideration count for more than 1/100th, even if there are 99
people one counts as epistemic peers?
The short answer is: no. If one really has 99 associates who one counts
as peers who have independently assessed a given question, then one’s
own assessment should be swamped. This is simply an instance of the sort
of group reliability effect commonly attributed to Condorcet. To make this
answer easier to swallow, consider a mathematical case. When you get
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one answer to an arithmetic problem, and 99 people you count as arith-
metical peers get another answer, it is quite clear that you should become
extremely confident in the answer of the majority.
The above discussion of the problem of spinelessness also is of use
here. From that discussion we learned that the people one counts as peers
on a given issue are (1) more rare than one would initially have thought,
and (2) very often in agreement with oneself. So in messy real-world cases
(involving basic political disagreement, for example), the equal weight
view permits one’s independent thinking on many matters to have signifi-
cant weight. It also requires one’s opinions to be swamped by the majority
when one counts a very great many of one’s advisors as peers. That is a lit-
tle odd, but in this case we should follow the Condorcet reasoning where
it leads: we should learn to live with the oddness.
13 Objections
Objection. The equal weight view escapes the problem of spinelessness
only by advocating an ostrich-like policy of listening only to those with
whom one already agrees.
Reply. First, everything said so far is compatible with the advice: lis-
ten to opposing arguments with an open mind. Everyone agrees that one
should do that. At issue is the degree to which the mere fact of disagree-
ment should change one’s position. In other words, at issue is how much
one should be moved when one either doesn’t know the reasoning be-
hind an advisor’s dissenting conclusion, or does know the reasoning, but
doesn’t find it compelling.
Second, the equal weight view often requires one to be moved a fair bit
by dissenting opinion (far more than most of us in fact tend to be moved).
For though controversial matters tend to be linked together in clusters, it
is not as though everyone walks in lockstep with their political, scientific,
or philosophical clique. For example, imagine that you and a friend are
presented with a tricky claim that you have not yet thought through. You
may well think that your friend is almost as likely as you to evaluate the
claim correctly, even if the two of you differ a bit on allied issues. If so,
and if you and your friend end up disagreeing, then the equal weight view
requires you to be significantly moved.
So the equal weight view doesn’t say: bury your head in the sand. It
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does say: defer to an advisor in proportion to your prior probability that
the advisor would be correct in case of disagreement. In practice, this
means deferring most to advisors whose views (on matters closely linked
to the issue in question) are similar to one’s own.34
Objection. Return to the case of Ann and Beth, friends at opposite ends
of the political spectrum. Ann counts Beth as less than an epistemic peer
when it comes to abortion. She does so because she judges that Beth has
gone wrong on many issues linked to abortion. But that judgment rests
on the assumption that Ann’s views on the linked issues are correct—an
assumption to which Ann is not entitled.
Rather than taking her views on the surrounding issues for granted,
Ann should attend to the larger disagreement between her and Beth: dis-
agreement about a whole cluster of issues linked to abortion. Ann should
think of this whole cluster as a single compound issue, and should take
into account Beth’s disagreement about that. When she does so, she can no
longer penalize Beth for going wrong on surrounding issues. So the equal
weight view entails that Ann should suspend judgment about abortion,
in light of Beth’s disagreement. Furthermore, similar reasoning applies in
many cases of real-world disagreement. So the equal weight view does
after all require suspension of judgment on virtually everything contro-
versial.
Reply. Consider the cluster of issues linked to abortion. Contrary to
what the objection supposes, Ann does not consider Beth a peer about that
cluster. In other words, setting aside her reasoning about the issues in the
cluster, and setting aside Beth’s opinions about those issues, Ann does not
think Beth would be just as likely as her to get things right. That is because
there is no fact of the matter about Ann’s opinion of Beth, once so many
of Ann’s considerations have been set aside. Hence the equal weight view
does not require Ann to suspend judgment about the cluster. That blocks
the objection.
But why is there no fact of the matter about Ann’s opinion, setting
aside her reasoning about the cluster? To see why, return to the exam-
ple in which you know Jennifer Lopez both from face-to-face interactions
and tabloid reports. In that example, there is a determinate answer to the
34Compare to Foley (2001, 105), which argues that one has (defeasible) reason to trust
the beliefs of an anonymous advisor, on the grounds that there are “broad commonalities
in the intellectual equipment and environment of peoples across times and cultures”.
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question: “What is your opinion of Lopez, setting aside what the tabloids
say?” That is because there is a relatively self-contained path along which
the tabloids influence your beliefs about Lopez. As a result, there is a nat-
ural way of factoring your belief state into a “prior” state, together with
some additional tabloid-based information.
In contrast, there is no determinate answer to the question: “What is
your opinion of Lopez, setting aside that humans have bodies and that the
Earth exists?” That is because there is no unique way of factoring your
belief state into a “prior” state, together with that additional information.
Setting aside that humans have bodies and that the Earth exists, how confi-
dent are you that Lopez dated Ben Affleck? Or that one of Lopez’s movies
was recently panned by critics? Or that Hollywood even exists? These
questions have no answers because the information to be set aside is en-
meshed in too much of your reasoning to be cleanly factored off.
The same goes for Ann’s reasoning about the cluster of issues linked to
abortion. That cluster includes a wide range of issues: whether humans
have souls, the age at which humans begin feeling pain, whether rights
figure prominently in a correct ethical theory, and so on. To set aside Ann’s
reasoning about all of these issues is to set aside a large and central chunk
of her ethical and political outlook. Once so much has been set aside, there
is no determinate fact about what opinion of Beth remains.
Of course, Ann may have opinions about Beth’s ability in other do-
mains, such as mathematics, etiquette, and film criticism. Suppose that
these opinions are independent of the cluster of issues surrounding abor-
tion. Why don’t they determine Ann’s evaluation of Beth once abortion-
related matters are set aside?
To see why not, note that such evaluations would depend on further
opinions: opinions on the extent to which ability in other domains pre-
dicts the ability to correctly answer questions in ethics. Ann’s opinions
on these matters—on what sorts of abilities are predictive of good ethi-
cal reasoning—are themselves wrapped up in Ann’s ethical and political
views. So setting aside Ann’s opinions on abortion-related matters means
setting these opinions aside. As a result, once abortion-related matters
have been set aside, Ann has no determinate opinion of Beth’s ability to
determine whether abortion is permissible.
It follows that in this case the equal weight view issues no determi-
nate verdict about how Ann should respond to the larger disagreement
between her and Beth. So the objection fails.
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In the above discussion it was assumed that the disagreement between
Ann and Beth goes extremely deep—so deep that there is no common
ground from which Ann could sensibly assess Beth’s basic political out-
look. What about cases of less extreme disagreement? For example, sup-
pose that Ann and Beth agree on a significant portion of their political
outlooks, and disagree only on abortion and some closely linked issues.
In that case, it may well be that Ann considers Beth a peer (or almost a
peer) regarding the issues in dispute between them. If so, then the equal
weight view does require Ann to give Beth’s view significant weight.
So in such cases—cases in which disagreement does not run so very
deep—the equal weight view does entail suspension of judgment on con-
troversial matters. But such cases only represent a small portion of cases of
disagreement about hotly disputed matters. As a result, the equal weight
view does not require an implausible across-the-board suspension of judg-
ment. It does require much more deference to advisors than most of us in
fact exhibit, but that is no embarrassment to the view.
14 Partial deference to oneself
We have seen how the equal weight view applies to cases of disagreement
with outside advisors. It says that one should defer to an advisor in pro-
portion to one’s prior conditional probability that the advisor would be
correct. But the view also applies to cases of disagreement with one’s fu-
ture or past self. It constrains how one should take into account the opin-
ions one had, or expects to have, when one has less than perfect trust in
one’s past or future judgment.
To see how the constraint operates, take the example of being guided
by past opinion (the case of being guided by future opinion is similar).
Suppose that you have just reevaluated a philosophical theory that you
accepted years ago. If not for your past opinion, you would now reject
the theory as false. How much should your past acceptance of the theory
temper your present rejection? The answer is that you should defer to
your past opinion in proportion to your prior conditional probability that
your past opinion would be right. More precisely, the crucial question is:
setting aside your recent rethinking of the issue, and setting aside your old
conclusion about it, which self would you expect to be right in case of this
sort of disagreement?
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There are a number of factors that determine the answer: whether you
think you’ve gotten sharper over the years, or have received relevant back-
ground information, or have caught what is clearly a mistake in your old
reasoning. But one factor is of particular note: the degree to which your
past and present selves agree on issues surrounding the disputed one.
If there is a great deal of agreement, then you will likely count your past
self as a peer, or as nearly one. If so, you should give your past conclusions
plenty of weight. In contrast, suppose that between then and now you
have undergone a fundamental change in view. Perhaps you have expe-
rienced a spiritual revelation, or a quick deconversion. Perhaps you were
exposed to a philosophical idea that dramatically reorganized your think-
ing about a large cluster of issues. Or perhaps you were part of an episode
of scientific change that was revolutionary in the sense of Kuhn (1970).
In such cases, you should regard your past self as having many mistaken
views about issues surrounding certain disputed ones. So in such cases,
you should severely discount your previous dissenting opinion.
What this shows is that the equal weight view provides a graded ver-
sion of Reflection—a version covering cases in which one only partially
defers to the judgment of one’s future or past self. The view has the effect
of tying one’s beliefs together over time. But note that the strength of the
ties is highly variable. Across periods of ordinary (modest) belief change,
the ties are strong. For across such periods, there is a great deal of back-
ground agreement. In contrast, across periods in which there is abrupt or
dramatic belief change, the ties are weak. For across those periods there is
little common ground between the selves at the earlier and later times.35
In such cases it may be inevitable that one’s earlier and later selves regard
each other as not to be trusted.
35For a detailed presentation of such a case, see Cook (1987).
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